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The NBER Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining 
Law Data Set 
Robert G. Valletta and Richard B. Freeman 
The NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set provides 
a comprehensive source that describes the status of state public sector 
collective bargaining policies for five main functional groups in all fifty 
states from 1955 to 1985.' Building on previous works by the Depart- 
ment of Labor, the American Federation of State, County, and Mu- 
nicipal Employees, Berkeley Miller of the University of South Florida, 
and John Burton of Cornell University, we have constructed this data 
set to provide longitudinal as well as cross-sectional information about 
state labor laws.* In its completed form, the data set embodies legal 
provisions for the five main public employee functions in all fifty states 
since 1955. The five groups covered are: state employees, municipal 
police, municipal fire fighters,  noncollege teachers,  and  other local 
employees. Some laws may cover other groups (such as prison guards, 
hospital employees, state police, etc.), but these five groups were the 
primary ones mentioned. Many states have comprehensive laws which 
cover all five groups; however, some make distinctions between these 
groups, as we shall discuss below. 
We  chose fourteen variables to represent relevant dimensions of the 
laws; a numerical coding scheme was devised for each in order to allow 
the proper distinctions to be made in the data set. These variables are 
divided into five main categories: contract negotiation (bargaining rights), 
union recognition, union security, impasse procedures, and strike policy. 
Richard B. Freeman is professor of economics at Harvard University and the director 
of labor studies at the National  Bureau of Economic Research. Robert G.  Valletta is a 
visiting assistant professor of economics at the University of California, Irvine. 
The authors wish to  thank Eric Larson for aiding in the construction of the data set, 
and particularly Lee Simmons for designing the data set and performing much of the 
research. 
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Coding sheets for these five categories, along with explanatory notes, 
are provided in tables 1A-lE.3 
To  illustrate  the nature  of  the data set and its contents, we have 
compiled a number of descriptive tables. Tables 2A and 2B indicate 
contract negotiation provisions (bargaining rights and scope) in the fifty 
states as of January  1984 and January  1969, re~pectively.~  The states 
are arranged from those with the strongest bargaining provisions  to 
those that prohibit collective bargaining. In table 2A, the first feature 
to stand out is the high degree of consistency for bargaining provisions 
across different functional  groups within a state; this is particularly 
true for states that provide strong bargaining rights. Of  the thirty-five 
states that  provide  strong bargaining rights and include  wages as a 
subject of bargaining (values 5 and 6) for at least one functional group, 
twenty-four do so for at least four functional groups; of those twenty- 
four, twenty-one provide strong bargaining rights for all five groups. 
Despite this consistency across functional groups within many states, 
there is variation between bargaining provisions within states. For ex- 
ample, in  table  2A, Texas and  Kentucky provide  strong bargaining 
rights only for police and fire and prohibit collective bargaining for at 
Table 1A 
Variable  Value 
Coding Sheet for Contract Negotiation Provisions 
(I)  Collective Bargaining Rights  0 = No provision 
1  = Collective bargaining prohibited 
2 = Employer authorized but not required to 
3  = Right to present proposals 
4  = Right to meet and confer 
5 = Duty to bargain  I  (implied) 
6 = Duty to bargain  I1 (explicit) 
0 = No provision 
1  = Excludes compensation 
2  = Includes compensation 
bargain with union 
(2) Scope of Bargaining 
Notes: This section originally contained an additional variable, intended to represent the 
extent to which collective bargaining agreements were subject to legislative recall. After 
some preliminary coding, this variable was abandoned; consistent distinctions could not 
be made across different state laws. 
Values  3, 4,  5, and 6  under variable  (I) can sometimes be difficult  to distinguish 
between. For 3 and 4, one needs to look  for the key phrases; however, in both these 
cases the public employer is  still free to unilaterally  set the terms and  conditions of 
employment (i.e., there is no obligation for the employer to actually bargain). Value 5 
means that although there is no  explicit statutory provision stating that the parties must 
come to an agreement, it is implied (frequently through specifying a ratification procedure 
or through listing failure to bargain  in good faith  under “Unfair Practices”) that  they 
must attempt to do so. Value 6 means that there is explicitly stated (frequently in the 
definition of “collective  bargaining”) an obligation for the parties to come to a written 
agreement. 401  Collective Bargaining Law Data Set 
Table 1B  Coding Sheet for Union Recognition Provisions 
Variable  Value 




(2) Term of Recognition 
(minimum period 
guaranteed until another 







Nonexclusive allowed or required 
Exclusive: petition and election procedure 
not specified 
Exclusive; petition and election procedure 
specified 
No provision 
Any time after certification 
At least 12 months since last election 
At least 12 months since last election and 
previous collective bargaining agreement has 
expired 
At least 24 months since last election (may 
or may not include contract expiration 
clause) 
Notes:  The election procedure specified typically includes provisions for the following: 
initial petition for certification (percentage necessary for acceptance, usually 30 percent), 
additional petitions to appear on ballot  (usually  10  percent of members of bargaining 
unit must sign for organization to appear), posted notices, timing of election and other 
procedures,  place  of  election,  restrictions on who  can vote, employer or employee 
organization noninterference, and runoff elections. 
“Nonrepresentation”  is  invariably a voting choice. and certification  can be legally 
revoked during the term of recognition. 
Petition and election procedures can generally be avoided if the public employer vol- 
untarily recognizes an employee organization and there is no challenge. 
Despite exclusive representation, most laws contain a clause stating that employees 
can individually present grievances (although a union representative frequently must be 
present). 
least one other group, while Maryland and North Dakota provide bar- 
gaining rights only for teachers. Other states may provide weaker “meet 
and confer”  or other provisions  for some groups but not for others. 
Thus, the variation  in bargaining rights allows for cross-sectional in- 
vestigations to be performed both across and within states. 
The longitudinal nature of the data set is illustrated by a comparison 
of tables 2A and 2B. Of the twenty-one states which had comprehensive 
strong bargaining laws in 1984, only twelve had strong bargaining laws 
for at least one group in  1969; of  those twelve, only five had strong 
bargaining provisions for all five functional groups.  Similar variation 
exists for states with other types of provisions. For example, Minnesota 
switched from “meet and confer” in 1969 for all five functional groups 
to strong bargaining rights  by  1984, while  Virginia  changed from a 
“permissive” (value 2) status for four groups in  1969 to prohibiting 
collective bargaining for all five groups by  1984. In general, the trend 
is toward more probargaining laws (see table 3), although antibargaining 402  Robert G.  Valletta/Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1C  Coding Sheet for Union Security Provisions 
Variable  Value 











(2)  Union Members’ Dues Checkoff 
(3) Union Shop  O= 
(4) “Right-to-Work”  Law  O= 
I= 
No provision 
Agency shop prohibited 
Agency shop negotiable 
Agency shop compulsory 
No provision 
Dues checkoff prohibited 
Dues checkoff negotiable 
Dues checkoff compulsory 
No provision 
Union shop prohibited 
Union shop negotiable 
Union shop compulsory 
has no “right-to-work”  law applying to 
public employees 
has a “right-to-work”  law applying to 
public employees 
Notes: The term “fair-share agreement”  is synonymous with “agency shop.” 
Agency shop provisions typically stipulate that the service fee shall be deducted from 
nonmembers salaries. Such provisions are distinct from dues checkoff, which stipulates 
that union  members’ dues shall be deducted from their salaries: the two types of pro- 
visions often exist separately. 
“Maintenance  of membership”  is another type of provision  relating to union  mem- 
bership; it stipulates that employees who join the union must maintain their membership 
for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement. We decided this was not important 
enough to code, although several states do have such provisions. 
Agency shops, dues checkoff, and union shops are “negotiable”  when the law stip- 
ulates that public employers and public employee unions may settle contracts that include 
such provisions. “Prohibited”  and “compulsory” are self-explanatory, except that dues 
checkoff is also coded as “compulsory”  when the public employer must deduct union 
dues at the request ofeither  the union or  individual employees. Also, individual employee 
consent is generally required by the law. 403  Collective Bargaining  Law Data Set 
Table 1D  Coding Sheet for Impasse Procedures 
Variable  Value 
(I) Mediation:  Availability 
(2)  Fact-finding:  Availability 
(3) Arbitration: Availability 
(4) Arbitration: Scope 
(5) Arbitration: Type 
0 = No provision 
1  = Specifically prohibited 
2  = Voluntary (both parties must consent) 
3  = Discretionary: Administrative agency may 
initiate, either unilaterally or upon request of a 
party to impasse. 
4  = Mandatory: Required by statute 
(same as mediation) 
(same as mediation) 
0 = No provision 
1  = Issues other than compensation 
2  = All negotiable issues 
0 = No provision 
I  = Conventional 
2  = Final offer-Issue  basis 
3  = Final offer-Package  basis 
4  = Any one of these types may be used 
Notes: The coding is intended to reflect the actual nature of the process provided for in 
law and may in some cases differ from the wording used in the law where that deviates 
from common usage.  For example, Alaska’s teachers’ law does not explicitly provide 
for fact-finding, but their so-called mediation process clearly includes fact-finding. The 
most important example of this is arbitration. We  define arbitration as being final and 
binding.  Some states have so-called  arbitration procedures  that are merely advisory, 
hence no different from fact-finding; we have coded such procedures as “fact-finding.’’ 
Table 1E  Coding Sheet for Strike Policy Provisions 
Variable  Value 
(I) Strike Policy  0 = No provision 
1  = Prohibited  with penalties specified 
2  = Prohibited  with no penalties specified (discretion of court) 
3  = Permitted (with qualifications) 
Notes: The values for this variable  represent broad categories. However, the types of 
penalties and qualifications used are very consistent across states, and the values rep- 
resent as fine a distinction between state policies as we are accurately able to construct 
from  the  laws.  Researchers should note that depending on the state, court-imposed 
penalties may be more severe than those provided for by law. 
In general, the penalties specified include one or more of the following: loss of  union 
certification, loss of dues deduction, loss of wages during strike (or twice wages), ter- 
mination  of employment, fines for union  and/or individual employees, and rehire on 
probation. 
No state permits its public employees to strike without qualifications. Typical quali- 
fications include: the previous collective bargaining agreement has expired and no new 
one has been reached; impasse procedures have been fully complied with; and at least 
XX days have elapsed since issuance of the fact-finders’ report. Such strikes can usually 
be enjoined if the courts decide that they have caused a threat to public safety or  health. 404  Robert G.  Valletta/Richard B. Freeman 
Table 2A  Bargaining Rights and Scope (as of  January 1984) 
State 
~ 
State  Other 
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Table 2A  (continued) 
State 
State  Other 
Employees  Police  Fire  Teachers  Local 
Virginia  1 
North Carolina  1 
1  1  1 
1  I  1 
Key: 
6 = Duty to bargain  11 (explicit) 
5 = Duty to bargain  1 (implied) 
4 = Right to meet and confer 
3  = Right to present proposals 
2  = Employer authorized but not required to bargain with union 
1  = Collective bargaining prohibited 
0 = No bargaining provision 
* = No provision as to the scope of  bargaining 
** = Wages are a prohibited subject of  bargaining 
Table 2B  Bargaining Rights and Scope (as of January 1969) 
State 
State  Other 
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Table 2B  (continued) 
State 
~~  ~~~ 
State  Other 
































































































































6 = Duty to bargain I1 (explicit) 
5 = Duty to bargain I (implied) 
4  = Right to meet and confer 
3 = Right to present proposals 
2  = Employer authorized but not required to bargain with 
I  = Collective bargaining prohibited 
0 = No bargaining provision 
*  = No provision as to the scope of bargaining 
** = Wages are a prohibited subject of bargaining 
union 
Table 3  State Counts by  Pro- or Antibargaining, 1969 and 1984 
I969  I984 
States all probargaining  5  21 
States mostly probargaining  5  4 
States mostly prohibiting bargaining  4  4 
States all  prohibiting bargaining  I  2 
Note: To be counted as all probargaining, states must have strong bargaining rights (values 
5 or 6) for all five functional groups. To be counted as mostly probargaining, states must 
have 3 or 4  strong bargaining groups. The same scheme was used for the “prohibiting” 
categories, using the value  I. 407  Collective Bargaining Law Data Set 
states in some cases adopted more explicit or stringent antibargaining 
provisions.  Overall, there is enough longitudinal variation to perform 
both within-state longitudinal and panel investigations. 
Several states stand out as early probargaining states: Washington, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. These states 
currently have broad probargaining laws that also extend to our other 
dimensions, such as impasse procedures. Not surprisingly, police and 
fire fighters were typically among the earliest groups to be covered by 
strong bargaining laws, in addition to sometimes being the only groups 
covered in a state (see table 2A). Several states have recognized ex- 
plicitly  in their laws the importance of assuring uninterrupted police 
and fire-fighting services and have instituted  strong bargaining  rights 
for these groups in the belief that such provisions, along with extensive 
impasse procedures and antistrike laws (see below, tables 6A and 6B), 
would assure smoother labor relations. Whether they have succeeded 
is the type of testable hypothesis that the data set will enable research- 
ers to investigate. 
Tables 4A and 4B list union security provisions as of January 1984 
and January 1969, respectively; the states are listed in the same order 
as in tables 2A and 2B. The incidence of these provisions within and 
across states follows patterns similar to those of the bargaining rights 
provisions in tables 2A and 2B. It should be noted that tables 4A and 
4B list only the strongest  union  security provision in effect for each 
functional group. However, as states with strong union  security pro- 
visions, such as required agency shops, also tend to have provisions 
for weaker union security arrangements, such as dues checkoff, the 
data set itself includes values for all union security mechanisms. Also, 
some states with right-to-work laws, which typically prohibit union and 
agency shops, have other security provisions,  such as allowing or re- 
quiring dues checkoff; these states have two numbers listed in tables 
4A and 4B. 
Comparing tables 2 and 4, we see that the states with stronger bar- 
gaining laws also tend to have stronger union security provisions. States 
with right-to-work  laws are more likely to have weak bargaining pro- 
visions or to prohibit bargaining,  supporting the use of right-to-work 
laws as  an indicator of antibargaining attitudes. The obvious exceptions 
to this are Florida, South Dakota, and Nebraska, each of which is a 
strong bargaining state but has a right-to-work law still on the books. 
Florida’s comprehensive 1975 law (preceded briefly by a 1973 law for 
fire fighters) enacted very strong bargaining rights in a state that pre- 
viously had only a right-to-work  law on the books. 
In contrast, a comparison of  tables 4A and 4B indicates that many 
states enacted stronger union security provisions during the years be- 
tween  1969 and  1984. In  1969, only  two states (Massachusetts and 408  Robert G. VallettalRichard 8.  Freeman 
Table 4A  Union Security Provisions  (as of January 1984) 
State  Other 
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Table 4A  (continued) 
State 
~ 
State  Other 
Employees  Police  Fire  Teachers  Local 
Virginia  I  I  1  1  1 
North Carolina  0  0  0  0  0 
Key: 
6  = Agency shop compulsory 
5  = Union shop negotiable 
4  = Agency shop negotiable 
3 = Dues checkoff compulsory 
2 = Dues checkoff negotiable 
1  = Right-to-work law (prohibits union shop and typically agency shop) 
0 = No union security provisions (union and agency shops may be prohibited) 
Table 4B  Union Security Provisions (as of January  1969) 
State  Other 
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Table 4B  (continued) 
State 
State  Other 



























































































































Agency shop compulsory 
Union shop negotiable 
Agency shop negotiable 
Dues checkoff compulsory 
Dues checkoff negotiable 
Right-to-work  law (prohibits union shop and typically agency shop) 
No union security provisions (union and agency shops may be prohibited) 
Vermont) had union security mechanisms permitting agency shops. By 
1984, nineteen states had union security provisions that were at least 
as strong as permitting agency shops (see table 5). Again, the general 
trend during these years was toward stronger probargaining provisions. 
Tables 6A and 6B list final impasse resolution and strike policy pro- 
visions as of the years 1984 and  1969, respectively; once again, the 
states are listed in the same order as in tables 2A and 2B. Only the 
final impasse procedure is listed. However, states with arbitration pro- 
visions  often  have mediation  and fact-finding provisions,  and states 
with fact-finding often have mediation provisions; the data set itself 
includes values for all these mechanisms for each state-function.  For 
mediation  and fact-finding,  only  their  availability  (i.e.,  whether the 
mechanism is mandatory, discretionary-requiring  the request of one 
of the parties, or voluntary-requiring  the consent of both parties) is 
shown. For arbitration, the scope and type of arbitration is also shown. 411  Collective Bargaining Law Data Set 
Table 5  State Counts for Union Security Provisions 
I969  1984 
Agency shop negotiable or compulsory  2  19 
Dues checkoff negotiable or compulsory  14  18 
Right-to-work law  14  15 
No provision  24  9 
Nore: Columns do not sum to fifty since some states have both a right-to-work law and 
dues checkoff provisions. 
Once again, states with stronger bargaining rights are more likely to 
have strong third-party impasse resolution procedures (where “strong” 
is defined by both the mechanism used and its availability). There are 
many  more  blanks  as we  move down tables 6A and 6B and  fewer 
functions with arbitration provisions. 
The patterns in impasse and strike provisions within and across states 
are similar to those in bargaining and union security provisions. How- 
ever, there is less consistency  across functional  groups for impasse 
procedures than there is for the other two dimensions.  In particular, 
police and fire fighters are more likely to be provided with mandatory 
or discretionary  arbitration than are the other functional groups (see 
table 7). 
Police and fire fighters are also much less likely to be granted a limited 
right to strike than are the other groups. As of  1984, only two states 
(Montana and Idaho) grant such a right to police or fire fighters, while 
nine states grant a limited right to strike to at least one of the other 
groups. However, most states prohibit strikes by public employees; of 
the forty-one remaining states, only three have no explicit strike pro- 
visions, leaving thirty-eight states as of 1984 that specifically prohibit 
strikes by at least one functional group and do not explicitly  permit 
strikes by any (see table 8). 
Finally, table 7 reveals once again the longitudinal change since 1969 
toward broader provisions;  the general  movement is away from no 
provision and toward some combination of mediation, fact-finding, and 
arbitration in most states. Mandatory and discretionary arbitration pro- 
visions were virtually nonexistent  in  1969, and only conventional ar- 
bitration was mentioned.  Table 8 indicates a similar phenomenon for 
strike policy provisions; the general movement is toward more explicit 
provisions, with many more states specifically prohibiting or allowing 
strikes in 1984 than in 1969. 
Our final descriptive table is table 9; it provides a rough  summary 
statistic indicating the public sector bargaining environment, as mea- 
sured by our variables, in all fifty states. In general, a higher variable 
value in our data set indicates a stronger probargaining provision. The Table 6A  Final Impasse Resolution and Strike Policy (as of January 1984) 
State  Other 
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Key: The first letter indicates whether there is mediation (M), Fdct-finding (F),  or arbitration (A). The first letter after the colon indicates 
whether the procedure is mandatory (M),  discretionary (D),  or  voluntary (V). For arbitration, the next symbol indicates the type ofarbitration: 
conventional (C), final offer by  package (FO),  final offer by issue (FOI), conventional or final offer (C&F),  no provision on the type (NP). 
An asterisk indicates that wages are an excluded issue for arbitration. Finally, the last letter indicates strike policy: prohibited with penalties 
(PP), prohibited (P), permitted  with qualifications (Pm). 414  Robert G. Valletta/Richard B. Freeman 
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Table 6B  Final Impasse Resolution and Strike Policy (as of January 1969) 
State  Other 
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Table 6B  (continued) 
State  Other 
State  Employees  Police  Fire  Teachers  Local 
-  -  -  Virginia  -  - 
North Carolina  -  -  -  -  - 
Kev: The first letter indicates whether there is mediation (M), fact-finding (F),  or arbi- 
tration (A). The first letter after the colon indicates whether the procedure is mandatory 
(M), discretionary (D), or voluntary (V). For arbitration, the next symbol indicates the 
type of arbitration: conventional (C), final offer by package (FO), final offer by  issue 
(FOI), conventional or final offer (C&F), no provision on the type (NP). An  asterisk 
indicates that wages are an excluded issue for arbitration. Finally, the last letter indicates 
strike policy: prohibited with  penalties  specified  (PP), prohibited (P), permitted  with 
qualifications (Pm). 
Table 7  State Counts for Final Impasse Resolution Procedures, 1984 and 
1969 
Mandatory or 
Discretionary  Voluntary  Mediation or 
Arbitration  Arbitration  Fact-finding  None 
1984 
Police  14  7  7  22 
Fire  17  5  II  17 
State employees  5  8  I1  26 
Teachers  6  II  14  19 







3  8  37 
3  10  34 
2  7  40 
2  8  39 
3  8  38 
Table 8  State Counts for Strike Policy 
1969  I984 
Permitted with qualifications  1  9 
Prohibited  18  I5 
Prohibited with penalties  7  23 
No provision  24  3 416  Robert G.  VallettaiRichard B. Freeman 

























































































































































6.5 417  Collective Bargaining Law Data Set 
exceptions are the “0” and “I”  values of the variables; the value “I” 
generally represents a restriction  on the relevant activity, while  “0” 
typically represents “no provision.” Thus, with a recoding so that the 
0’s and 1’s in the variables are interchanged, a simple sum of all the 
variable  values  across all five functions in  a  state is a good  overall 
indicator of  how  amenable the state is  to public  sector unions  and 
collective bargaining.5 The value of this statistic is shown for both the 
years 1984 and 1969. 
The states listed first tend to have higher values in this table, although 
not in exact order. Again, this indicates that states with strong provi- 
sions in one area also tend to have them in others; the same holds true 
for states with  weak, antibargaining,  or no provisions.  The general 
trend toward stronger and more provisions is illustrated by a compar- 
ison of the two columns  in table 9. Most  states’ summary statistics 
increased  significantly between  1969 and 1984, while a few remained 
the same or decreased over the period. The states with the most pro- 
bargaining environments as of 1984 are Hawaii, Connecticut, and Or- 
egon. The early leaders in this area are Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Washington. Of the remaining states, almost all experienced a signifi- 
cant change in their public sector bargaining environments. 
In sum, the 1970s were a period of tremendous growth in laws pro- 
tecting the existence and activities of public sector unions. Although 
the laws written during this period demonstrate marked consistency in 
the language used  and  issues  addressed, the range  of different bar- 
gaining environments is quite broad, whether we compare across func- 
tions, across states, or over time. This evolving legal framework is a 
rich source for investigations, whether they concern wages, strikes, or 
any other outcome associated with public sector collective bargaining. 
Our data set is intended to make such investigations easier to design 
and implement and also to allow further research into the evolution of 
the laws themselves. 
Notes 
I.  Previous attempts to provide similar information in compact form exist. 
The U.S. Department of  Labor’s Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations, 
published approximately every second year since 1971, contains descriptions 
of public sector collective bargaining policies in the fifty states plus the District 
of Columbia and several territories.  It is a particularly useful reference  since 
it includes  descriptions  not only of codified laws, but also of important case 
decisions and Opinions of State Attorneys General, each of which is often used 
to define state policy. 
The AFSCME Research Division provided us with a computer printout of 
the fifty  states’ legal  provisions  as of March  1985. Their information  covers 418  Robert G.  VallettalRichard B. Freeman 
most of the relevant dimensions of the laws but does not indicate when changes 
occurred nor list provisions specifically prohibiting bargaining or  union security 
arrangements. 
A broader attempt, which includes the coding of provisions into numerical 
form and covers the fifty  states in  the years  1966 and  1979,  was made in 
December 1984 by Berkeley  Miller of the University of  South Florida. This 
data set aids longitudinal investigation but omits important dimensions of the 
laws, particularly in the areas of union security and impasse procedures. 
Finally, John Burton of Cornell University has recorded the status of most 
of the relevant dimensions of the laws since about 1950 and has provided us 
with tables summarizing the laws and when changes occurred. Our data set is 
closest in form and content to his information, although ours has been coded 
into numerical form and stored on computer disk. 
2.  Our procedure was to use the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) Sum- 
mary of  Public Sector Labor Relations to discern which states had codified 
laws and where these laws could be found in the statutes, then to review the 
statutes. Since some laws had been repealed and hence were not listed in the 
DOL Summary, we were careful to use all available sources to locate and copy 
any previous laws not currently on the statutes. 
Constructing complete legislative histories entailed difficulties. Many of the 
laws had significant amendments. Since the state statutes contained only cur- 
rent versions of the laws and typically did not explain any amendments made, 
we had to look up most amendments in the session law files to see when and 
if  significant revisions were made. Frequently, we would read an amendment 
only to discover that it simply changed a wording. 
The laws were then carefully read and the dimensions that we deemed rel- 
evant (see tables I A-  1 E) were noted. Using fourteen variables and a numerical 
coding scheme of our own design, the laws were translated onto code sheets. 
For those states which  did not have laws on the books, we used the DOL 
Summary and other sources to find  relevant  cases and Office  of Attorney 
General (OAG) rulings. Where the laws and cases were ambiguous, we tele- 
phoned a source in the state (usually the state Public Employment Relations 
Board or the Office of the Attorney General) to obtain an accurate interpretation. 
3.  The data set is arranged as follows. Each observation contains the status 
of all fourteen variables for a particular functional group in a particular state 
for one year. The states are ordered alphabetically, and within each state the 
functional groups are ordered as  follows: state employees, police, fire fighters, 
teachers, other local employees. For example, the first observation is for state 
employees in Alabama during the year 1955; the 30th observation is for Alabama 
state employees in  the year 1984; the  151st observation is  for Alaska state 
employees in the year 1955, etc. To avoid confusion, each observation includes 
eighteen variables; the fourteen legal  variables, plus variables indicating the 
state, functional group, month, and year. For years in which no change in the 
law occurs, the month variable is coded as “00”; for years in which the law 
changes, the month variable is coded as the month that the change became 
effective. For some cases and OAG decisions, the exact effective date is un- 
known; the month is coded as “13”  in these instances, making it clear that a 
change has occurred. Finally, since states varied in the up-to-dateness of their 
available  statutes, the final  observation for different state-functional groups 
typically corresponds to different dates. The earliest date is January 1984, the 
latest  is  April  1985,  hence some state-functional groups contain thirty-one 
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4.  January 1984 is the most recent date we could use and still insure complete 
accuracy for all fifty states. Researchers should note that Ohio passed a com- 
prehensive law effective April 1984, and Illinois passed a law effective January 
1984 for teachers and July 1984 for all other groups. These laws are included 
in the data set, but they are not included in the tables presented here. 
5.  For example, the collective bargaining rights variable was recoded so that 
the value 0 represents “collective bargaining prohibited”  and the value 1 rep- 
resents “no provision on collective bargaining.”  This recoding was done for 
all variables except for “type of  arbitration” and “strike policy.”  The “type 
of arbitration” variable was excluded from calculation of the summary statistic 
presented in table 9, as no natural ordering exists for this variable. The strike 
variable was recoded so that the value 2 represents “no provision,” the value 
0 “prohibited  with penalties specified,”  and the value  1  “prohibited  with no 
penalties specified.” Data set users may want to devise similar recoding schemes. 
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